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Most researchers find that the non-teaching wage has a significant effect on teacher attrition. 
Surprisingly no study that estimates this effect actually uses former teachers‟ wages. The use of 
aggregate wage data can potentially cause upward bias coefficients due to selection issues. Using 
wages  of  former  teachers  in  a  simultaneous  probit-tobit  system  of  equations,  the  effect  is 
estimated and found to be insignificant. The results indicate that higher teaching wages and 
student  teaching  significantly  lower  attrition  while  being  attacked  or  threatened  during  the 
previous school year and whether the teacher lives in a household with income above $40,000 
significantly increase attrition. 
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1.  Introduction 
  The attrition rate of teachers continues to receive significant attention both by researchers 
and by policymakers. One of the main questions is whether teacher attrition is driven by the 
allure of higher paying jobs in alternative occupations. Surprisingly, no study that estimates the 
effect of non-teaching wages or the wage premium (the difference in non-teaching to teaching 
wages) on teacher attrition uses former teachers‟ non-teaching wages. The majority of papers use 
aggregated data such as average starting wage based on the teachers‟ degree subjects (Murnane 
et al (1989)), county-level per-capita earnings (Imazeki (2005), Ondrich et al (2008)), relative 
income  of  college  graduates  who  are  not  teachers  (Flyer  and  Rosen  (1997),  Ballou  and 
Podgursky  (1997),  Loeb  and  Page  (2000)),  or  regional  dummy  variables  (Hanushek  et  al. 
(2004)). All of these papers find that teachers are more likely to leave the teaching profession 
due to higher non-teaching wages or the wage premium. 
The  reliance  on  constructed  non-teaching  wages  is  due  to  the  limited  availability  of 
former teacher data. The majority of data on teachers are from administrative records, which do 
not track teachers after they depart from teaching. One known paper that has such data is Scafidi 
et  al.  (2006),  who  map  public  data  from  Georgia  school  administrative  records  to  Georgia 
Department of Labor data to investigate whether teachers who leave the teaching profession earn 
higher salaries at their outside jobs. Their descriptive analysis finds that very few of those who 
leave  teaching  take  jobs  that  pay  more  than  the  minimum  teacher  salary.  However,  no 
regressional analysis is performed. 
  Given that Scafidi et al. (2006) find few former teachers earn higher wages upon exiting 
teaching in Georgia, this brings into question why studies find positive significant non-teaching 
wage effects on teacher attrition. While not formally proven in this paper, it is highly probable 3 
that the imputed non-teaching wages, based on an aggregate of similar non-teaching individuals‟ 
wages  (e.g.,  the  mean  or  median  income/earnings  of  similar  individuals),  are  too  large  and 
overstate how much a teacher may earn outside of teaching. There are some compelling reasons 
why this might be the case. Given that most distributions of wages are right-skewed, imputed 
non-teaching wages based on the mean of individuals similar to the teacher overstates the wage 
the teacher would most likely earn. Taking the mean of the groups‟ log wages or the median of 
the groups‟ wages seems more appropriate but may also be problematic. If differences exist in 
the wages that former teachers can garner in non-teaching jobs, then these constructed medians 
represent the mean or median non-teaching wages of the pool of non-teachers and not that of 
teachers, i.e., selection issues matter. For example, education degrees are highly specialized and 
these skills may not be as valuable in the non-teaching sector as non-education degrees, as such, 
the median wage of the teachers‟ university classmates may overstate the teachers‟ potential non-
teaching wage. Thus, any statistically significance of imputed non-teaching wages on teacher 
attrition may be due to the data construction process. 
The biggest hindrance to direct estimation of the effect of the non-teaching wage or wage 
premium  on  teacher  attrition  is  that  only  one  of  the  two  wages  is  observable  based  on  the 
teachers‟ decisions to exit the teaching profession. This means that estimating the effect of the 
non-teaching wage or wage premium necessarily requires the estimation of some wages. Given 
that relying on aggregate non-teachers‟ wages may generate a statistically significant effect when 
in actuality there may or may not be one, a more precise wage estimation technique is required, 
one which takes into consideration selection issues. 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. The first is to estimate non-teaching wages of 
teachers  who  remain  in  teaching.  The  restricted-access  Teacher  Follow-up  Survey  (TFS) 4 
contains the current wages of former teachers which can be used to estimate the non-teaching 
wages of current teachers. Since the exit decision may be correlated with wages, selection issues 
still exist in estimating this wage. The second is to estimate the effect of the non-teaching wage 
on a teacher‟s decision to exit teaching. A selection model is able to estimate the wages and the 
effects  on  the  teacher  attrition  jointly.  Specifically,  a  simultaneous  probit-tobit  system  of 
equations which estimates the exit decision along with two wage equations: one for the non-
teaching  wage  and  another  for  the  next  year‟s  teaching  wage.  The  system  also  permits  the 
propensity to exit the teaching profession to depend on the wages which are being estimated 
simultaneously. By taking into consideration the self-selection of the teacher on her non-teaching 
wage,  i.e.,  a  teacher  who  can  gain  a  higher  wage  outside  of  teaching  is  more  likely  to  be 
observed exiting teaching, the issues of using imputed wages are absolved. 
The crux of using such approach is identification. Identification can be secured through 
model specification or exclusion restrictions. Since the model is estimated through Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE), identification is secured through model identification. However, 
there are some natural exclusions that can be used as restrictions nonetheless. The exclusion 
restriction requires are regressors in the exit decision equation that are excluded from the wage 
equations. The potential candidates are: whether the teacher was attacked or threatened by a 
student  during the previous  school  year, whether the teacher held  an outside job  during the 
school  year  for  teaching  related  work  and  non-teaching  related  work,  whether  the  teacher 
received a teacher practicum (student teaching), and the number of dependents under the age of 
five. 
The descriptive statistics indicate that the wage premium is large for those who ultimately 
exit teaching  while the  estimation results  indicate that the  non-teaching  wage  is  statistically 5 
insignificant on teacher attrition. On the other hand, those with higher teaching wages are more 
likely to remain teaching. The estimation also reveals that teachers who exit were attacked are 
threatened, and live in households with incomes above $40,000 (excluding their own) are more 
likely  to  exit.  Teacher  preparedness  through  student  teaching  (teaching  practicum)  and  state 
certification both reduced attrition as well. Further, classroom and student characteristics are 
insignificant  on  attrition;  neither  class  size,  number  of  courses,  percent  of  limited-English 
students, percent of individual education plan students, percent eligible for school lunch students, 
or  race  matching  between  teachers  and  students  have  any  effect  on  teacher  attrition.  The 
insignificance of classroom and student characteristics is of little surprise as these characteristics 
can be rectified, for the most part, by transferring schools. The only school characteristic that is 
statistically significant is whether the teacher works in a unionized school. Some community 
characteristics  are  also  significant  at  lowering  teacher  attrition;  these  are:  the  log  average 
earnings in the community and the unemployment rate. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the empirical model, Section 3 
provides a descriptive analysis of the data, Section 4 provides the regressional analysis of the 
data, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  The Exit Decision and Wage Equations Model 
Each teacher faces two wages at the end of the school year: her non-teaching wage and 
her next school year‟s teaching wage. The primary problem when trying to extract a „causal‟ 
effect of the non-teaching wage or the wage premium on teacher attrition is that only one of two 
wages is observed depending on the choice of whether to remain in teaching. To address this 6 
issue, I use a simultaneous probit-tobit system.
1 In this model, the propensity to exit the teaching 
profession  depends  on  the  teaching  and  non -teaching  wages.  This  specification  permits 
correlation between unobservables  in the decision and wage equations and also provides an 
explicit role for the counterfactual or potential wages – the wages that could have been observed 
but is not by the econometrician due to the self-selection of teachers to either remain in teaching 




, ti w  and 
*
, nt i w  be the next year‟s teaching wage and non-teaching wage for individual 
i  respectively  and  let 
*
i    be  the  reservation  wage  premium  that  summarizes  her  specific 
preferences for teaching. Given these definitions, teacher i is assumed to exit teaching if 
 
* * *
,, ln ln nt i t i i ww     (1) 
                                                 
1 This estimation technique was first proposed by Lee (1978) and further developed by Lee and 
Trost (1978) and Willis and Rosen (1979). The model is part of a class of models referred to as a 
Type 5 Tobit Model (Amemiya (1984)) and has been subject to considerable scrutiny over the 
years. See Garen (1988), Brooks et al. (1998), Chib (2007), among many others for examples of 
application of the model. 
2 The data provides a Lickert scale response on whether a school staffing action (e.g., involuntary 
transfer, laid-off) was important on the teacher‟s decision to exit the teaching profession. This 
indicator could potentially be used to exclude involuntary exits. However, this self-reported data 
have very few (less than 15% of those who exit) indicating so. Another issue is that no additional 
information is available on whether the teacher could have simply switched to a different school. 
Regressional analysis conducted excluding these individuals found no change in the magnitude 
of coefficients or statistical significances of any of the variables. 7 
Since 
*
i   summarizes her preferences over teaching, this can be either positive or negative. More 
specifically, I assume that 
*
i   is a function of the characteristics of the teacher and the attributes 
of the school and community according to 
 
*
i i i i XA          (2) 
where  i X   is  a  vector  of  individual  characteristics,  i A   is  a  vector  of  school/community 
characteristics where individual i taught the previous school year, and  i   is normally distributed 
with a mean of zero and a variance of 
2
  . 
  Thus teacher i exits the teaching profession if 
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,, ln ln nt i t i i i i w w X A          (3) 
Equation (3) may be written in the form of a probit model: if 
* ( 0) 1 ii d I d    , then teacher  i 
chooses to exit teaching, otherwise not, according to 
 
* * *
0 , , ln ln i nt nt i n t i i i i d w w X A               (4) 
where  j   is a scalar for  {0, , } j nt t   and the usual normalization 
2 1     is used as only the sign 
of 
*
i d  is observed. The other observable variables are the limited dependent variables  , nt i w  or 






























  (5) 
  The interest of the model is to correctly estimate 
*
, [ *]/ ln nt i E d w . This shows how the 
expected probability of leaving the teaching profession changes with the non-teaching wage. 8 
The  approach  of  this  paper  is  to  create  the  counterfactual  wages  by  making  strong 
distributional assumptions. There are two wage equations per teacher: one equation for her non-
teaching wage and another equation for her teaching wage. These are 
 
*
, 0 1 2 , ln t i t t i t i t i w Y B u          (6) 
 
*
, 0 1 , ln nt i nt nt i nt i w Z u       (7) 
where  0 , j   and  , ji u  are scalars for  { , }, j nt t   and  i Z ,  , i Y   , i B   1, nt    1, t    2 t   are matrices; there 
are  N  observations, i.e.,  1, , iN  .  i Z  are personal characteristics and experience related to 
the non-teaching workforce,  i Y  are personal characteristics and experience related to teaching 
while  i B  are school characteristics along with wage structure characteristics of the school where 
the teacher taught the previous year.
3 In this model, the wage equations  (6) and (7) cannot be 
consistently  estimated  by  OLS  using  the  observed  wage  since  ( | 1) 0
nt E u d    and 
( | 0) 0
t E u d  . 
A simple way of obtaining consistent estimations of the exit decision is to substitute the 
wage equations (6) and (7) into (4) yielding the reduced form for 
*
i d : 
 
**
0 1 1 1 i i i i i i i d Y B Z X A                 (8) 
where 
*
,, i i t i nt i uu     . The estimates are consistent but the effects of the direct effect of the 
teaching and non-teaching wage are no longer  available in  this reduced form. These can be 
backed out once consistent estimates of the wages are obtained. To do this requires additional 
structure. A common approach is to permit the errors to be joint normal: 
                                                 
3 District characteristics are used for public schools since the SASS provides this information at a 
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  (9) 
The system of equations (6)-(9) is now the same as a Roy model. There are multiple ways 
to estimate this system. The generic estimation procedure consists of three steps. The first step is 
to estimate the reduced form model to obtain consistent estimates of the  ˆ  s. The most common 
approach to obtain consistent estimates is Heckman‟s two-step method (see Heckman 1979). 
While  Heckman‟s  two-step  method  is  widely  used,  it  is  not  efficient.  Maximum  likelihood 
estimation (MLE) is consistent and efficient but sometimes has difficulty converging. The log-
likelihood function,  i l , for teacher i for this system of equations is given by
4 
     
1 0 * * * *
,, 0 ( , ) ( , )
ii dd
i i t i i i nt i i l f d w dd f d w dd
 
     (10) 
where 
*
, ( | 0) t i i f w d   is the bivariate normal density of  , ti w  and 
*
i d , and 
*
, ( | 0) nt i i f w d   is the 
bivariate normal density of  , nt i w  and 
*
i d . Since  tnt   does not enter the likelihood, estimation on 
the exit decision and each wage equation can be done separately (See Cameron and Trevidi 
(2005)). Step 1 is estimated by MLE unless it does not converge and then Heckman‟s two-step 
method is applied. Step 2 consists of constructing the estimated wages 
*
, ˆ ln nt i w  and 
*
, ˆ ln nt i w  using 
the  ˆ  s from step 1. The last step consists of treating the wage instruments as fixed regressors and 
replace 
*
, ln nt i w  and 
*
, ln nt i w  in the right-hand side of (4) with 
*
, ˆ ln nt i w  and 
*
, ˆ ln nt i w . The structural 
parameters  are  then  estimated  by  Probit  MLE.  Estimates  of  the  structural  parameters  are 
consistent and asymptotically normal. 
                                                 
4 See Amemiya (1984) for further details. 10 
Selection  models  require  identification  through  either  model  specification  or  through 
exclusion  restrictions.  For  both  estimation  procedures,  identification  can  be  obtained 
theoretically through model specification. However, there are some natural regressors that are 
available to use as exclusion restrictions. The first two are whether an additional job was held 
during the school year for both teaching related work and non-teaching related work. Both of 
these are labor supply indicators. Whether a teacher was attacked or threatened by a student 
during the previous school year should also affect a teachers‟ decision to exit teaching. Student 
teaching  or  a  teacher  practicum  should  affect  a  teachers‟  decision  to  exit  teaching  as  these 
individuals  are  more  informed  of  what  teaching  entails,  providing  an  opportunity  to  try  out 
teaching prior to entering the teacher labor force.
5 Last is the number of dependents under the 
age  of  five.  Teaching  is  location  specific  and  the  teaching  schedule  is  quite  inflexible. 
Individuals may find other occupations  more flexible which better suit  them when they  have 
young children. 
Statistical analysis indicates that these variables are strong instruments to identify the 
teachers‟ decision to exit teaching. A non-teaching outside job, being attacked or threatened, 
receiving a teacher practicum, and number of children under 5 are all positive and significantly 
correlated with the decision to exit teaching, while outside jobs related to teaching is negatively 
correlated, but not significantly. All of the variables are statistically insignificant in both wage 
equations (along with the correlations between the exclusion variables and the wages) and are all 
                                                 
5 The data indicates that only 54% of those who have taken a practicum are also state certified. A 
practicum should be excluded from the teaching wage equation as this may increase first year 
wages and is hence already built-in; thus, further increases from the practicum are not expected 
in the second year. 11 
statistically significant in the exit decision equation. Testing exclusion restrictions are performed 
using separate F-tests with hypotheses that the identification variables have coefficients equal to 
zero in the exit and wage equations. The alternatives are that at least one of the coefficients is 
different from zero for each equation. The tests failed to reject the hypotheses for both wage 
equations (p-values of .59 and .19 for the teaching and non-teaching wages) while rejecting the 
hypothesis for the decision equation (p-value of .0061). Thus, there is theoretical and statistical 
evidence that these instruments are strong and valid. 
 
3.  Data and Descriptive Analysis 
The data comes from a sample of first year teachers from the restricted-access version of 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey (TFS) for school years 2000-01 and 2004-05 along with school 
data contained in the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) for school years 1999-2000 and 2003-
2004.
6 The TFS is comprised of a subsample of teachers from the SASS.
7 These datasets provide 
information on current and former teachers and their schools. Specifically, for each former 
teacher, the data includes the occupational status and sector, current wage, and socioeconomic 
characteristics that permit an evaluation of the teacher-specific covariates along with the non -
                                                 
6 Information regarding the sampling technique and survey layout is provided on the National 
Center  for  Education  Statistics  website  „Schools  and  Staffing  Survey‟.  See  the  References 
section of this paper for further information. 
7 The two rounds of data do not link the teachers over time, creating a stock sample. The main 
feature of stock sampling is spell length bias as the probability of being in the sample increases 
with spell length (see Lancaster, 1990). The complexities of stock sampling are eliminated since 
the stock is also a flow for first year teachers. 12 
teaching wage. The data contains information on teachers in public, public charter, parochial and 
non-parochial  private  schools.  It  also  contains  a  wide  variety  of  school  policies  where  the 
teachers taught. Unlike district or state level data, the TFS tracks teachers when they move out of 
district or state bounds. Thus, current and former teachers are accounted for regardless of where 
they relocate. 
  The full construction of the data is left to an appendix (available from the author upon 
request). The teacher data from TFS is merged with school characteristics and additional teacher 
variables from the SASS files by teacher and school/district control numbers. One drawback of 
the TFS data is that it does not contain any measure of ability and scholastic aptitude. The SASS 
does contain the university that teachers attended for their undergraduate degree. Using data 
from  the  National  Postsecondary  Aid  Study,  the  average  ACT  score  for  each  university  is 
calculated and matched to each teacher. To obtain economic indicators around the school locale, 
census data is merged by 3-digit zip code to the school where the teacher taught the previous 
year. The 3-digit zip code aggregate is chosen to encompass most of a teacher‟s local job search 
area. The final sample consists of 1,118 current and former teachers who have just completed 
their first year teaching. 
The  main  interest  is  to  estimate  the  effects  of  the  non-teaching  wage  and  various 
covariates  on  first  year  teachers‟  decision  to  exit  the  teaching  profession.  Descriptions  and 
summary statistics of these variables are reported in Table 1. The exit decision variables in 
equation (4) include teacher characteristics (female, married, non-white, under the age of 27, 
household with over $40K income, number of children under the age of five, ACT score, outside  
teaching job, outside non-teaching job, dummies for type of degree the teacher holds (special ed. 
degree,  math  or  science  degree,  advanced  degree),  teacher  preparedness  variables  (state 13 
certification,  teacher  practicum,  ed.  degree),  classroom  characteristics  (class  size,  number  of 
courses,  attacked  or  threatened),  school  characteristics  (union,  public),  and  local  economic 
indicators (percent with BA+, community log earnings, unemployment rate, urban). 
The variables of the log of teaching wage estimation, equation (6), include the log of last 
years‟ teaching wage (log(school wages)), dummies for type of degree the teacher holds (special 
ed. degree, math or science degree, ed. degree, advanced degree), teacher preparedness variable 
(state certification), and demographic characteristics (gender, race, married). Since most public 
schools have a salary schedule regardless of unionization, an interaction term adv_degXpublic 
between a teacher working in a public school and having an advanced degree is required. The 
variables of the log of non-teaching wage estimation, equation (7), include the log of last year‟s 
teaching wage (log(school wages)), degree type and level (math or science degree, advanced 
degree,  ed.  degree),  work  experience  (experience,  squared  experience),  demographic 
characteristics (female, non-white, married, ACT score, household with above $40K income), 
and local labor market indicators (percent with BA+, community log(earnings), unemployment 
rate, urban, year 2000). Last year‟s teaching wage is included as this is a part of their earnings 
profile and provides individuals exiting teaching with a reference point when bargaining for 
wages outside of teaching. 
  The mobility rates of the teachers are provided in Table 2. Approximately 75% of all 
teachers remained teaching at the same school as the previous year, 15% remained teaching full-
time but at a different school, while 11% exited the teaching profession. Teachers who remain at 
the same school or teach at a different school are grouped together as „Stayers‟. „Exiters‟ are 
those who are no longer full-time teachers. 14 
  The current and expected occupational status of former teachers is provided in Table 3. 
The  majority  of  former  teachers,  64%  of  them,  exited  full-time  teaching  to  start  a  new 
occupation. The remaining third either exited the workforce or are currently unemployed. This 
data is in stark contrast to data using the NLS-72 used by Stinebrickner (2002) in which 67.5% 
of those who exited teaching exited the labor force as well. Since the TFS survey is administered 
early in the school year, the high unemployment rate is most likely picking up the transitional 
unemployment from leaving full-time teaching and not yet obtaining employment elsewhere. 
This  is  somewhat  validated  by  responses  of  former  teachers  on  what  they  expect  their 
occupational  status  to  be  the  following  school  year  (.1%  indicated  that  they  would  be 
unemployed and seeking work); however, no secondary follow-up is conducted to verify their 
expectations.
8  It  is  interesting  that  many  individuals  continue  to  work  inside  the  field  of 
education but in non-teaching positions. On the other hand, those who left the education sector 
have no plan to return. In fact, the data indicates that an additional 6% expect to obtain positions 
outside of education in the following year. 
Table 4 provides the average earnings of current and former teachers in their first year of 
teaching (previous year) and the average earnings  in their current occupation. Since individuals 
unemployed or not in the labor force do not have a wage, they are excluded for the current year‟s 
wage only. Comparing current to former teachers‟ wages as teachers during their first year, the 
                                                 
8 The model could be generalized to include the decision to exit the labor force (See Lee (1983), 
Dubin and McFadden (1984), and Dahl (2002) for model specifications). Given limited data on 
those who exit t he labor force, it is not feasible to model separate decisions. Regressions 
excluding these individuals provided similar estimates. The omitted non-teaching wages of these 
individuals is a non-issue as they can be estimated along with current teachers. 15 
data indicate that  those who remained in  teaching  earned $3,416 more than those who left. 
Current wages of former teachers in their new occupation are much closer to those who remain 
in teaching, a difference of $404. For those teachers who remain teaching, their wages grew by 
$1,267 while wages of those who exited grew by $4,280. 
 
4.  Results 
4.1.  Estimates of the Wage Equations 
  Table 5 presents the estimates on the covariates in the wage equations. These coefficients 
measure  the  effect  that  increasing  a  particular  variable  has  on  real  yearly  log  wages.  The 
coefficients on most variables have the expected signs and significance. Last year‟s teaching 
wage and the indicator for female had predictive power on next year‟s salary, however, none of 
the other coefficients are close in magnitude to previous year‟s wage
9. This is not a surprise since 
most institutional differences are already built into the previous year‟s teaching wage. 
The statistically significant coefficients of the non-teaching wage equation are last year‟s 
wage, the indicator that the teacher lived in a household earning over $40,000 (excluding her/his 
own wage), and the percent in the community with a bachelor‟s degree or beyond. Separate 
Wald tests are conducted to test whether the teaching and exit decision equations and the non-
teaching wage and exit decision equations are independent. The hypothesis is rejected at a 1% 
                                                 
9 The TFS contains information on whether schools can provide incentive based pay. Preliminary 
regression indicated that incentives have insignificant effects on raising teachers‟ wages. This 
may reflect that incentives are built into their previous year‟s wage or that retaining first year 
teachers may not be as high of a priority as experienced teachers. Since data is only available for 
one round, this variable has been excluded to increase sample size. 16 
level for the teaching wage and at a 5% level for the non-teaching wage. The MLE estimation 
process  also  provides  the  statistics     and   .     indicates  the  correlation  between  the  exit 
equation and the teaching and non-teaching wages respectively. Both correlations are strong and 
significant.   is the control function in the wage equation or the inverse Mill‟s ratio. This can be 
considered  the  omitted  variable  which,  when  included,  unbias  the  coefficients  in  the  wage 
equations. If the control function is statistically significant, then selection issues are important 
and the control function has adjusted the other coefficients for selection. Both   are statistically 
significant. Thus, these statistics indicate that sample selection correction is needed.  
 
4.2.  Estimates of the Exit Decision Equation 
The marginal effects and their standard errors obtained from maximum likelihood probit 
of  the  structural  exit  decision  equation  are  reported  in  Table  6.  The  marginal  effects  are 
calculated at the means of the continuous independent variables (see Table 1) and uses discrete 
changes of 0 to 1 for dummy variables. The coefficients estimates are precisely determined in 
general and most have the expected signs and significances. The pseudo R-squared is .22. 
 
4.2.1.  Wages 
  One of the main purposes of this paper is to investigate whether, and to what extent, the 
non-teaching wage affects the decision to exit the teaching profession. The coefficient on the 
non-teaching  wage  is  highly  insignificant.  On  the  other  hand,  teachers‟  wages  is  highly 
significant and has a negative effect on teacher attrition. One way to check the robustness of the 
wage effects is by adjusting the wage instruments (with all other variables remaining the same). 
This  is  done  by  replacing  all  non-teaching  and  teaching  wages  with  the  estimated  wages 17 
provided by step 2 as outlined in Section 2, and not just censored wages. The results do not 
change with this robustness check, the non-teaching wage coefficient remains insignificant while 
the teaching wage coefficient remains significant. 
 
4.2.2.  Teacher-specific Characteristics 
The  data  provided  in  the  TFS  survey  permits  a  very  extensive  examination  of  the 
relationship  between  teacher  characteristics  and  the  decision  to  exit  teaching.  As  expected, 
gender, race, age, and marital status are not significant effect on teacher attrition. Similar to 
Stinebrickner (2002), each additional dependent under the age of five has a significant effect on a 
teachers‟ decision to exit teaching.
10 Teachers who live in households with incomes above $40K 
(excluding their own wage) are 40% more likely to exit teaching. This may indicate that these 
individuals‟ labor wages are not the primary income source for their household, permitting these 
individuals  to  be  choosier  in  job  selection.
11  Another branch of literature has indicated that 
higher ability individuals are less likely to remain in teaching (see  Murnane and Olsen 1989). 
The results indicate that those with higher ACT score are not any more likely to leave than those 
of lower scores. Considering this measure is computed based on the teacher‟s university average, 
little can be interpreted by this result and should not be taken as evidence against the existing 
results from the literature. 
                                                 
10 Stinebrickner (2002) uses data on whether a child wa s born. The TFS does not provide such 
information. 
11 Due to the wording of the TFS survey questions, all additional sources are included in the total 
household income including a spouse and any secondary income from outside jobs and non-labor 
income sources. 18 
The signs for the effect of degree level or type are as expected: the effect is positive for 
individuals with a math or science degree, negative for individuals with advanced degrees, and 
negative for individuals with special education degrees. However, none of these variables are 
significant accept holding an education degree. Even though the estimation conditions on wages 
should mute these effects, there is an additional non-wage reason why degree type and level may 
make  a  difference  on  the  exit  decision:  individuals  may  earn  advanced  degrees  to  become 
certified and are more committed to the profession. 
 
4.2.3.  Teacher Preparedness 
There  are  three  indicators  for  teacher  preparation  available  in  the  TFS:  whether  the 
teacher is state certified, whether a teacher had a practicum prior to beginning full-time teaching, 
and  degree  type.  State  certification  reduces  a  teachers‟  probability  to  exit  teaching  by  5.7 
percentage  points  (statistically  significant  at  5%)  while  having  a  practicum  generates  a  12 
percentage points decrease in the probability to exit teaching (statistically significant at 1%). The 
effect of holding an education degree is the smallest with a decrease of 5%. Since only half of all 
teachers who are state certified receive a practicum, being state certification does not imply that 
the teacher had any classroom experience prior to commencing teaching. These results are also 
consistent with Goldhaber and Brewer (2000) and Wilson and Ferrini-Mundy (2001, 2002). 
 
4.2.4.  Classroom and School Characteristics 
The classroom and school characteristics are grouped together as they both affect the 
work environment of teachers. Being attacked or threatened during the previous school  year 
increases the probability of exiting by 13 percentage points. This is new in the literature and is a 19 
serious  concern.  All  of  the  remaining  classroom  and  school  characteristics‟  effect  are 
insignificant  except  whether  the  school  where  the  teacher  taught  the  previous  year  was 
unionized. The effect of unionization generates a 10 percentage point decrease in the probability 
of exiting teaching. This may indicate that unions provide barriers to dismissal which prevent 
teachers  from  being  dismissed  or  that  unions  provide  better  working  environments  which 
teachers find more favorable. 
 
4.2.5.   Community Characteristics 
The economic environment of the community in which the school is located also affects a 
teacher‟s decision to exit teaching. In an effort to encompass a large portion of teachers‟ local 
employment search area, the community data is aggregated to the 3-digit zip code level. The 
results indicate that as the local unemployment rate rises, teachers are less likely to leave the 
teaching profession. Another significant effect is the average earnings in the community. As 
community earnings increase, teachers in those communities are less likely to leave teaching. 
This  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  higher  income  communities  tend  to  have  more  parental 
engagement in the classroom or that there are fewer issues at schools with children from these 
communities. 
 
4.3.  Robustness of Results 
  Robustness  checks  are  conducted  to  verify  the  results.  There  are  three  additional 
specifications  that  seem  appropriate:  subsampling  the  data  by  gender,  including  additional 
student and school characteristics, and a parsimonious model excluding many insignificant and 
low  power  variables.  Gender  subsampling  is  done  as  female  labor  supply  decisions  have 20 
traditionally been different than males. For instances, females tend to be the primary caregiver of 
young child and are more likely to take leave after a baby is born. It also provides a benchmark 
to other estimations of female exit decision research (see Stinebrickner (2002), Imazeki (2005), 
Ondrich et al. (2008)). Student and school characteristics are more likely to affect the decision to 
switch schools and hence to remain in teaching. Both Hanushek et al. (2004) and Imazeki (2005) 
found significant effects of student and school characteristics on a teachers‟ decision to exit 
teaching. The student characteristics are the percent eligible for free lunch, the percent of non-
white,  interaction  of  non-white  teachers  with  percent  of  non-white  students,  the  percent  of 
limited-English  proficiency  students,  and  the  percent  of  individual  education  plan  students. 
However, the plausibility of a teacher exiting teaching instead of switching schools due to one of 
these characteristics is quite low. 
For brevity, I provide the marginal effects for the structural exit decision equations for a 
select number of variables for females and males in Table 7. The estimates indicate that many of 
the prior results still hold. The effect of the non-teaching wage remains insignificant for both 
genders while the effect of the teaching wage is significant and almost double for male teachers 
as female teachers. The effect of teacher preparedness remains the same with male teachers more 
likely  to  stay  if  they  have  had  a  teacher  practicum.  The  effect  of  state  certification  is  a  5 
percentage  point  decease  in  the  probability  to  exit  teaching  for  females  compared  to  a  12 
percentage  point  difference  for  males.  Interestingly,  the  effect  of  living  in  households  with 
incomes  above  $40K  is  almost  twice  as  large  for  males  as  females  which  increases  the 
probability of exiting by 57 percentage points. 
Table 8 provides the marginal effects for the extended and reduced specifications with 
the baseline marginal effects included for reference. In either specification, the effect of the non-21 
teaching wage remains statistically insignificant while the effect of the teaching wage remains 
positive and significant on teacher attrition. In the extended specification, classroom and school 
characteristics  are  included.  Of  the  classroom  characteristics,  the  number  of  distinct  courses 
taught in a given week (which identifies the number of preparations) and class size, both have 
insignificant  effects  on  a  teachers‟  decision  to  exit  teaching.  Further,  all  of  the  school 
characteristic coefficients have insignificant effects as well. There are a few effects which are no 
longer  significant  in  the  extended  specification.  These  effects  are  state  certification  and  the 
number of dependents under the age of five. 
In the reduced specification, many of the teacher-specific characteristics are excluded 
because they had no estimated effect in the baseline specification or in the literature. The results 
indicate that the effects all remain statistically significant from the baseline specification with 
only a few effects changing in magnitude. The magnitude of effect of a practicum increases by .2 
percentage  points,  the  magnitude  of  effect  of  being  threaten  or  attacked  decreases  by  1.3 
percentage points, the magnitude of effect of unions increases by 2 percentage points, and the 
magnitude of effect of community earnings decreased by .79 percentage points. 
 
6.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this paper the effect of the non-teaching wage on teacher attrition is examined. The 
results indicate that the effect of the non-teaching wage is statistically insignificant. In an attempt 
to provide some assurance to this result, multiple regressions with various specifications are 
performed. None of the results of the various specifications change the statistical insignificance 
or  low  magnitude  of  the  effect  of  non-teaching  wages  on  teacher  attrition.  The  descriptive 
statistics indicate that those who are observed exiting the teaching profession earn more than as 22 
teachers. However, their outside wage is quite equivalent to that of teachers who remain in the 
teaching profession. This is due to former teachers‟ teaching wages being considerably below the 
average of those who remain in teaching. Thus, for those who exit, working in a position outside 
of teaching provides similar wages to teachers who remain in teaching. The regressional analysis 
indicates that those who are paid more as teachers are more likely to remain. Along with wages 
is the effect of living in a household with incomes above $40,000 (excluding their own). This 
significantly raises the probability of exiting by 40%. 
Some of the largest effects on teacher attrition identified in this paper are from teacher 
preparedness. Teachers who are better prepared through a teacher practicum are more likely to 
remain in teaching. This may reflect these individuals‟ desired to teach prior to the practicum or 
may also reflect that a practicum provides the first in-class experience for many individuals who 
think they want to become a teacher. Given no in-class experience to form expectations of what 
teaching entails, the teacher practicum updates these expectations with more precise information 
on whether they would enjoy teaching. Thus, the effect of the practicum allows individuals to opt 
out of teaching prior to entering the teacher labor market. Thus, a practicum can be used as a 
selection mechanism to prevent individuals who are most likely to exit teaching from entering 
the teaching profession. Allocating resources to improve teacher qualifications prior to entering 
the classroom may reduce teacher attrition by increasing their pay grade and by having a more 
committed pool of incoming teachers.
12 
                                                 
12  On 22 October, 2009, the U.S. Education Secretary Arne Duncan speaking at Columbia 
University said that many institutions are doing a mediocre job of preparing teachers for the 21
st 
century  classrooms  and that teachers‟ college need to  improve teacher  preparedness  through 
more in-class experience prior to entering the teacher labor force. 23 
The effects of many other variables are found to be significant on reducing attrition. As 
the number of children under the age of 5 increases, a teacher is more likely to exit teaching. 
Being attacked or threatened is also a significant effect that increases the probability of exiting 
by  10%.  This  result  is  of  serious  concern  which  requires  further  evaluation  by  school 
administrators,  policymakers,  and  researchers.  Classroom  characteristics  have  insignificant 
effects on teacher attrition: neither class size nor the number of courses taught affected teacher 
attrition. Similarly, the effects of student characteristics on teacher attrition are insignificant and 
of low magnitude. It seems plausible that teachers displeased with one of these characteristics 
can switch schools to rectify it.  
All of the above results must be taken into consideration with the implicit attrition that 
has taken place by individuals opting out of the teaching prior to entering the teacher labor 
market.  Changing  labor  market  opportunities  for  women  and  unions  have  effectively  pulled 
higher  quality  teachers  out  of  the  teaching  sector  prior  to  entering  (see  in  Flyer  and  Rosen 
(1997), Hanushek and Rivkin (1997), Hanushek and Rivkin (2003), Goldhaber and Liu (2003), 
Stoddard (2003), Bacolod (2006), Lakdawalla (2006), and Gilpin and Kaganovich (2009)). Thus, 
any policy changes must take into consideration the effect on the pool of potential teachers. 
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Variable Definition Mean S.D
Teacher Characteristics
   female Female: 1 0.73 0.44
   non-white Non-white: 1 0.19 0.39
   married Married: 1 0.47 0.50
   under age 27 Under the age of 27: 1 0.55 0.50
   number of children under age 5 Number of children under 5 0.26 0.54
   ACT score Imputed ACT score 21.70 2.51
   experience Teacher's age - 24 7.77 7.25
   squared experience (Teacher's age- 24)^2 112.84 186.01
   ed. degree Holds education degree: 1 0.51 0.50
   special ed. degree Holds special education degree: 1 0.09 0.28
   math or science degree Holds a math or science degree: 1 0.20 0.40
   advanced degree Holds an advanced degree: 1 0.16 0.36
   advanced degreeXpublic ADV_DEG*PUBLIC 0.09 0.28
   log(school wages) Pervious year's wages as a teacher (in logs) 10.32 0.24
   outside teaching job If person had outside teaching job during school year: 1 0.08 0.26
   outside non-teaching job If person had outside non-teaching job during school year: 1 0.15 0.36
   household with over $40K If person lives in a household with income above $40K (excluding their own) 0.24 0.43
   state certification Teacher holds regular, standard state, or advanced professional certificate 0.43 0.49
   practicum If teacher had a practicum: 1 0.81 0.39
Classroom Characteristics
   class size Teacher's average class size 14.62 4.79
   number of courses Number of separate courses taught in given week 3.15 3.87
   attacked or threatened Attached or threatened during school year 0.12 0.32
School Characteristics
   public Public school: 1 0.61 0.49
   union School has union: 1 0.43 0.50
   percent eligible for free lunch Percent of students eligible for free lunch 35.52 31.36
   percent non-white Percent of non-white students 36.89 33.87
   non-white teacher-students Interaction between non-white teacher and percent non-white students 11.61 28.21
   lep Percent of limited-English proficiency students 5.41 14.31
   iep Percent of individual education plan students 11.58 15.30
Community Characteristics
   percent with BA+ Percent of area with at least a bachelor's degree (3-digit zip code level) 22.57 10.67
   community log(earnings) log average earnings for community (3-digit zip code level) 10.12 0.29
   urban Urban: 1 0.78 0.41
   unemployment rate Unemployment rate in percent (3-digit zip code level) 6.21 2.81
   year 2000 Year 2000: 1 0.51 0.50
Table 1





Teaching at the Same School 74.6
Teaching at a Different School 14.8
No Longer Teaching 10.7
Total 100.0
In percent.







Full-time Teaching 0 27.7
Non-Teaching Occupations Inside of Education 29.9 15.0
Occupations Outside of Education 33.6 39.9
Not in the Labor Force 21.4 17.2
   Caring for Family Member 4.9 7.3
   Student 16.5 9.9
Unemployed and Seeking Work 15.1 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0
In percent.









Difference in Wages 
Across Groups
Previous Year's Wages (1st year as a Teacher) 30,106 33,522 3,416
Current Year's Wages (2nd year) 34,385
a 34,789 404
Difference In Wages Across Years 4,280 1,267
All wages are in 2004 dollars.
a:  Includes only individuals who are currently employed full-time.  
 31 
Table 5
Estimates for Salary Equations
Teacher Characteristics
constant  1.638 (.536) ***  1.866 (2.922) 
log(school wages)    .824 (.052) ***    .577 (.189) ***
female  –.054 (.023) **  –.032 (.088) 
non-white    .035 (.025)    .151 (.093)
married  –.024 (.021)   –.071 (.087) 
household with over $40K  –.005 (.025)  –.604 (.193) ***
ACT score    .005 (.004)   –.009 (.016) 
education degree    .038 (.022) *    .071 (.098)
math or science degree  –.012 (.025)     .022 (.093) 
advanced degree    .047 (.048)     .089 (.100) 
advanced degreeXpublic  –.035 (.059)     ---
special ed. degree  –.073 (.039) *    ---
state certification  –.057 (.023) ***
experience     ---  –.015 (.022) 
squared experience     ---    .001 (.000) 
School  Characteristics
public    .033 (.029)     ---
union    .043 (.025) *    ---
Community Characteristics
urban  –.005 (.028)    .012 (.101) 
community log(earnings)    ---    .381 (.253) 
percent with BA+    ---  –.011 (.007) *
year 2000    ---    .004 (.084) 
Log likelihood  –179.10 –376.96
ρ    .857 (.046) *** –.841 (.134) **
λ    .142 (.018) *** –.475 (.146) **
ln(Teacher Wage) ln(Outside Wage)
Note: A * signifies statistical significance at the 10 percent level, ** signifies statistical 
significance at the 5 percent level, and *** signifies statistical significance at the 1 percent 
level.  32 
Table 6
Structural Equation Estimates - Marginal Effects
Teacher Characteristics
   non-teaching wage –.020 (.063)
   teaching wage –.277 (.074) ***
   outside teaching job –.007 (.048) 
   outside non-teaching job   .078 (.041) **
   practicum –.120 (.042) ***
   state certification –.057 (.029) **
   household with over $40K   .400 (.037) ***
   female   .014 (.031) 
   non-white   .018 (.036) 
   under age 27 –.030 (.028) 
   married   .002 (.028) 
   number of children under age 5   .043 (.023) *
   ACT score   .008 (.005)
   education degree   .0052 (.030) *
   math or science degree   .001 (.032) 
   advanced degree   .005 (.038) 
   special ed. degree –.062 (.041)
Classroom Characteristics
   attacked or threatened   .131 (.053) ***
School Characteristics
   public   .012 (.034) 
   union –.104 (.033) ***
Community Characteristics
   percent with BA+   .002 (.002)
   community log(earnings) –.206 (.101) *
   urban –.026 (.036) 
   unemployment rate –.015 (.005) ***





Note: A * signifies statistical significance at the 10 percent level, ** signifies 
statistical significance at the 5 percent level, and *** signifies statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level.  33 
Table 7
Structural Equation Estimates for Exit Decision by Gender
Marginal Effects
Teacher Characteristics
   non-teaching wage   .002 (.081) –.011 (.121) 
   teaching wage –.280 (.076) *** –.721 (.269) ***
   outside teaching job   .024 (.060)  –.113 (.065)
   outside non-teaching job   .054 (.050)    .089 (.069) 
   practicum –.074 (.046) * –.224 (.085) ***
   state certification –.052 (.033) –.121 (.056) **
   household with over $40K –.360 (.043) *** –.567 (.078) ***
Classroom Characteristics
   attacked or threatened   .076 (.054) *   .279 (.103) ***
School Characteristics
   union –.086 (0.035) ** –.120 (.069) *
Community Characteristics
   community log(earnings) –.228 (.114) ** –.158 (.210) 
   unemployment rate –.014 (.007) ** –.021 (.010) **
Log likelihood –344.10 –119.9
Pseudo R-squared  .2036  .3160





A * signifies statistical significance at the 10 percent level, ** signifies 
statistical significance at the 5 percent level, and *** signifies statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level.
All other regressors included as specified in Section 3. 




Structural Equation Estimates - Marginal Effects
Teacher Characteristics
   non-teaching wage –.020 (.063) –.014 (.069)   .024 (.054) 
   teaching wage –.277 (.074) *** –.287 (.078) *** –.350 (.080) ***
   outside teaching job –.007 (.048)  –.025 (.056)  –.016 (.047) 
   outside non-teaching job   .078 (.041) **   .072 (.043) *   .075 (.040) **
   practicum –.120 (.042) *** –.124 (.046) *** –.150 (.040) ***
   state certification –.057 (.029) ** –.042 (.031) –.056 (.028) **
   household with over $40K   .400 (.037) ***   .382 (.041) ***   .416 (.037) ***
   female   .014 (.031)    .002 (.003)    ---
   non-white   .018 (.036)  –.067 (.059)    ---
   under age 27 –.030 (.028)  –.052 (.031) *   ---
   married   .002 (.028)  –.004 (.031)    ---
   number of children under age 5   .043 (.023) *   .019 (.024)    .039 (.022) *
   ACT score   .008 (.005)   .008 (.006) *   .010 (.005) **
   education degree   .0052 (.030) * –.049 (.035) 
   math or science degree   .001 (.032)    .001 (.035)    ---
   advanced degree   .005 (.038)    .007 (.042)    ---
   special ed. degree –.062 (.041) –.052 (.045)    ---
Classroom Characteristics
   attacked or threatened   .131 (.053) ***   .101 (.049) **   .118 (.049) ***
   number of courses   ---   .001 (.004)    ---
   class size   ---   .001 (.003)    ---
School Characteristics
   public   .012 (.034)    .019 (.037) 
   union –.104 (.033) *** –.095 (.032) *** –.084 (.029) ***
   percent eligible for free lunch   --- –.001 (.001)    ---
   percent non-white   --- –.001 (.001)    ---
   non-white teacher-students   ---   .001 (.001)    ---
   lep   --- –.001 (.001)    ---
   iep   --- –.001 (.001)    ---
Community Characteristics
   percent with BA+   .002 (.002)   .002 (.003)    ---
   community log(earnings) –.206 (.101) * –.214 (.112) –.127 (.051) ***
   urban –.026 (.036)  –.017 (.039)    ---
   unemployment rate –.015 (.005) *** –.014 (.006) ** –.012 (.005) **
   year 2000   .356 (.085) ***   .061 (.031) **   .483 (.095) ***
Log likelihood –478.43 –389.22 –480.76
Pseudo R
2  .2140 0.2271 0.2102
Observation 1118 947 1118
a: MLE did not converge. Estimated through Heckman's two-step method.
Baseline Specification Extended Specification
a Reduced Specification
Exit Decision
Note: A * signifies statistical significance at the 10 percent level, ** signifies statistical significance at the 5 percent 
level, and *** signifies statistical significance at the 1 percent level.  